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Trade policies are part of a complex economic 
labyrinth, intricately connected to a web of 
vested interest groups. Interest groups, in a 
general sense, can be described as those 
groups interested in the outcomes of a 
particular decision-making process because (i) 
they are financially affected by the decision 
taken; or (ii) they have an ideological stake in 
the legislative and regulatory actions. Whereas 
category (i) may include ‘vested’ interest 
groups, such as corporate bodies and trade 
associations, most ‘public’ interest groups1 fall 
under category (ii). This policy brief explores 
the strategies of vested interest groups and role 
played by public interest groups in trade 
policy-making, both in the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) and the European Union. 
It identifies ways in which the influence of 
various interest groups on EU trade policy 
could be better balanced, with the overarching 
objective of achieving sustainable 
development.  
 
IMBALANCES OF PARTICIPATION IN THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION 
 
Despite an outwardly democratic appearance 
of equal participation by all Members in 
consensus-based decision-making, the WTO 
lacks internal transparency. It also lacks 
external transparency. While the WTO does 
not allow active participation or voting by 
civil society representatives of industry or 
public interest organisations, it allows their 
limited participation as observers in selected 
meetings at Ministerial Conferences. Outside 
of Ministerial Conferences, civil society has 
no formal access to the WTO committees or 
working groups charged with daily operations, 
either as observers or for the purpose of 
distributing information. 
The symposia organised by the WTO 
Secretariat, side events at Ministerial  
 
 
Conferences and informal day-to-day meetings, 
are simply channels of communication between 
civil society and trade negotiators. 
 
The WTO has been criticised for the lack of 
transparency in its institutional arrangements, 
secrecy in its decision-making processes and its 
overall failure to give due weight to broader policy 
objectives such as health and environmental 
protection. According to some environmental non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), the WTO is 
dominated by corporate interests.2 Despite the fact 
that formal channels of participation in the WTO 
are closed to public interest and industry groups 
alike, industry or corporate access and influence at 
the national level has a significant impact on the 
decisions taken in the WTO. 
 
CORPORATE LOBBY GROUPS AND THE 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
 
Relations between the European Commission and 
industry lobby groups have evolved over time. 
Since the late 1980’s, EU liberalisation, 
deregulation and privatisation policies have 
facilitated the waves of mergers and acquisitions 
resulting in corporate concentration in Brussels.3 
More than two hundred corporations have their 
European government affairs offices in Brussels 
and they are supported by no less than five 
hundred corporate lobby groups. In some cases, 
the corporate lobby groups act as a proxy for the 
citizen-based constituency lacking in the European 
Commission. Though the power of the European 
Parliament is expanded by both the Maastricht and 
the Amsterdam Treaties, it plays a very limited 
and indirect role in trade policy-making, and 
thus is less pursued by lobby groups. Involving 
corporate lobby groups in the decision-making 
process means other stakeholders, such as 
environmental organisations and trade unions, may 
be sidelined. Some environmental groups lack 
resources, both financial (advertising, establishing 
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front organisations, donations to public relations 
companies) and human (hiring experts and 
researchers, establishing national level bodies). 
Centralisation of power of the EU in Brussels also 
means there is less access for national level public 
interest organisations in EU level decision-making 
processes.  
 
COMMITTEE 133: A KEY ROLE IN THE EU 
TRADE POLICY 
 
The non-transparent nature of the trade decision-
making process in the EU has been identified as 
facilitating the growth of industry lobby groups. 
The EU has exclusive competence over trade 
policy, as reaffirmed in the proposed EU 
Constitution.4 Within the EU, it is the Commission 
that takes the lead in trade policy-making, and the 
‘133 Committee’5 is the main decision-making 
forum. The 133 Committee does not have any 
formal operational guidelines, it has no set 
deadlines for consultation on Commission 
proposals, and the response time for comments 
from Committee members depends on the urgency 
of the case.6 Both the European and national 
parliaments have failed to exert any control over 
the 133 Committee. Apart from Directorate-
General (DG) Trade of the European Commission, 
other DGs, such as DG Environment or 
Development, may attend 133 Committee 
meetings but they do not take the floor.6 
Therefore, the decision-making is highly 
compartmentalised and little horizontal co-
ordination exists between different DGs with a 
shared interest in an issue. Moreover, it is arguable 
that the Regulation on public access to EC 
documents7 does not entitle the public to access 
133 Committee documents on the ground of 
confidentiality.  
There have been several calls for reform of the 
133 Committee which include formalisation of the 
consultation process, implementation of 
transparency procedures that apply to other 
Council meetings, and encouragement of the full 
participation of other EU institutions.6 
 
STRATEGIES AND INFLUENCE OF VESTED 
INTEREST GROUPS IN EU TRADE POLICY 
MAKING: THE EXAMPLE OF 
BIOTECHNOLOGIES 
 
Vested interest groups, such as industry lobby 
groups, deploy various strategies in policy making 
processes. An example is the biotechnology sector 
where industry groups influence the regulatory 
process by relying on diverse strategies. Sector-
specific groups tend to gain wide access because 
they offer specific information.8 Within the EU 
biotechnology sector, the combined political 
influence of biotech firms is channelled through 
federations, associations and confederations with 
interests in agriculture, trade and consumer issues. 
Umbrella organisations, such as EuropaBio, 
Eurocommerce, European Federation of 
Biotechnology and COPA-COGECA, participate 
in the EU policy-making process in accordance 
with their own mandates and strategies.  
Corporate lobby groups are not only large in 
membership, but they also collaborate with each 
other to strengthen their collective efforts.2 These 
umbrella groups are active in agenda setting and 
regulatory development. They operate at multiple 
levels to influence the policy-making processes: 
through inter-governmental organisations and 
through national associations, presenting their 
views to the respective EU Member State 
governments.  
The involvement of corporate lobby groups can be 
either formal or informal. Formal involvement 
includes submission of regular position papers, 
contributions at public hearings as experts, and 
participation in consultation meetings that open 
communication channels between decision-makers 
and industry. Major corporate groups are often 
informally involved in the work of the decision-
making body, for example, through participation 
in advisory groups, regular contact with high-level 
bureaucrats and politicians, drafting proposals and 
assisting in setting agendas for policy making.  
Corporate lobby groups can, therefore, implement 
various strategies to influence the decision-making 
process, such as: (i) re-emphasizing the 
importance of free trade: condemning any 
measure which does not conform to industry’s 
preferred standards as ‘illegitimate’ barriers to free 
trade. For example, US industry has attacked EU’s 
de facto moratorium on GM crops as an illegal 
restriction on trade. (ii) voluntary guidelines: 
appealing for a harmonised effort to synchronize 
risk assessment procedures internationally, the 
biotech industry has supported initiatives such as 
the 1992 OECD’s guidelines on Safety 
Considerations for Biotechnology9 which are 
aimed at reducing barriers to trade by making 
regulatory requirements more transparent, 
predictable and universal, thus helping to reduce 
transaction costs for business. (iii) technicality: 
Vested Interests and Trade Policy Reforms 
  
ensuring that regulations are as technical as 
possible in order to exclude from the decision 
those who are not able to reach the same technical 
level. (iv) sound science: promoting scientific 
principles that compare the novel aspects of 
technologies with what is already assumed to be 
safe. (v) develop related regulation: influencing 
related intellectual property regulation by claiming 
that intellectual property protection is crucial to 
their business strategies. (vi) promote protectionist 
regulation: lobbying for more restrictive 
regulation in order to create a market-entry barrier 
to smaller competitors that are less able to afford 
the cost of regulatory compliance.10 
ROLE OF PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS IN THE 
TRADE POLICY MAKING PROCESS 
 
Similar to corporate groups, European public 
interest groups have also formed umbrella 
organisations, such as the European 
Environmental Bureau (EEB), and other European 
level networks, to contribute actively to the 
political agenda in the environmental sector. 
However, most environmental groups lack the 
financial resources to participate in the policy 
making processes, from the initiation phase 
through to policy decision and implementation, as 
intensively as their corporate counterparts. A 
limited number of environmental NGOs, such as 
WWF, Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, have 
offices in Brussels. However, the number of 
environmental NGOs is well below that of 
corporate lobby groups, with staff having to cover 
special issues simultaneously and being unlikely to 
specialise. Apart from institutional factors such as 
size, membership, funding, and relationship with 
national authorities, there are several other 
determinants of successful NGO networking: 
familiarity with the EU decision-making structure 
and process; location in Brussels is considered a 
decisive advantage; a co-ordinated or concerted 
approach to influencing EU-wide legislation and 
policies; exchange of information among NGO 
networks; and promoting transparent and 
inclusive decision-making options, thus pressing 
for a change in the EU decision-making process. 
The actions of public interest groups can serve to 
counterbalance the regulatory flaws and gaps 
which might result from intense business lobbying 
and can point legislators’ attention to wider public 
concerns. The role of public interest groups was 
evident when the European Commission adopted a 
process-oriented, consent-based and risk 
assessment-reliant precautionary approach to the 
regulation of GMOs. Initially, the environmental 
groups campaigning for stricter regulations of 
GMOs relied on legal challenges and actions that 
intended to restrain, restrict and regulate the 
actions of multinational corporations (MNCs).10 A 
subsequent strategy has been to undermine the 
market for GM crops by encouraging farmers to 
conclude that the risks associated with GMOs 
outweigh the benefits of growing GM crops. A 
further strategy has been to weaken the 
technocratic nature of policy discourses around 
biotechnology by subjecting expert claims to 
public scrutiny. Finally, environmental groups 
have played the role of public watchdogs by 
monitoring the enforcement of biotech regulations. 
In this way, environmental groups have gradually 
promoted scepticism about the safety of GMOs 
and have drawn companies into a public debate 
about the environmental and human safety of 
GMOs.10  
MOVE TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE TRADE 
POLICY MAKING 
 
The successful interest groups, be they corporate 
or environmental, are those that exhibit 
professional characteristics, namely, resources, 
regular contact with bureaucrats, and an ability to 
provide policy-makers with sound information and 
advice. Reputations for expertise, reliability and 
trust are key resources for vested interest groups. 
Their lobbying style may be as important as the 
content and objectives of the lobbying itself. In 
order to balance the influence of various interest 
groups in the EU trade policy making, there seems 
to be a need to move: 
♦ From secrecy to transparency: 
Transparent decision-making processes, at the 
EU and WTO level, would require further 
information-sharing, publication of committee 
reports, and effective and timely consultation 
processes. A move towards more accountable 
trade policies would certainly involve increased 
parliamentary scrutiny at all levels of trade 
policy, improved coherence inside the European 
Commission, and would enhance external 
transparency of the 133 Committee. Moreover, 
existing EU regulations related to access to 
information and public participation in decision-
making processes must be compatible with the 
1998 Aarhus Convention.11 Improved 
collaboration and structured partnership with 
public interest groups will assist the EU in 
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achieving its commitment to transparency, 
participation and democracy - as envisioned by 
the EU Sixth Environmental Action Programme 
and the forthcoming EU Constitutional Treaty. 
 
♦ From confrontation to partnership: 
Interaction between NGOs and corporate groups is 
complex and multi-dimensional. Environmental 
NGOs either recognise the role of the industry 
lobby and are willing to work together to achieve 
common objectives, or distrust the activities of 
corporations, and MNCs in particular. Corporate 
support could be invaluable for environmental 
monitoring and for implementing community 
development projects, as well as ensuring 
corporate compliance with the local, national and 
international regulation. More successful 
collaboration among European environmental 
NGOs could be possible if they were able to 
jettison subtle competition within the 
environmental sector for membership, financial 
support, or status in the policy processes. 
♦  From reactive to proactive style of 
lobbying: Trade policies are an amalgam of 
country-specific and cross-border issues and are 
inseparable from other policy areas. As the 
agenda-setting has become more political and 
uncertain, there is a need for public interest 
NGOs to become more proactive both at the 
technocratic level in the direction of the 
European Commission, and at the political level 
in the direction of the European Parliament. 
There is a further need to have open and 
extended networks, rather than exclusive policy 
communities.  
♦  From profit-oriented to sustainable 
business practice: Some industry groups are 
adapting their practice to become more 
environmentally motivated. A few MNCs are 
moving towards more sustainable practices in 
order to: avoid negative publicity; avoid threats 
of fines and lawsuits; win new markets for clean 
technologies; apply government regulations; and 
show genuine commitment to protecting the 
environment.12 
♦  From good practice to regulation: Within 
the EU and the WTO, lobbying by interest 
groups is prompted by either economic or 
ideological or non-commercial motives. 
Whatever the type of lobbying, there is a greater 
need for regulation as not all groups are well-
organised, or well-represented. Lobbying 
processes within the EU could be structured in a 
way to reduce the possibility of abuse by various 
vested interest groups. New legislation, 
modelled on the 1995 US Lobbying Disclosure 
Act,13 might be useful to regulate disclosure of 
information, register lobby groups, account for 
financial donations made to political parties, and 
monitor and report lobbying activities.  
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